We study the information content and consequences of third-party voting advice issued during proxy contests. Focusing on recommendations by a leading proxy advisor, we find significant abnormal stock returns around the dates recommendations become public. The economic interpretation is that voting advice conveys new information to the market.
INTRODUCTION
Proxy voting is a major corporate activity. During the 2005 U.S. proxy season, over 299 billion shares were voted to elect 35,283 individual directors, ratify 3,300 auditors, adopt 2,293 compensation plans, and approve 340 M&A transactions and a large number of internal governance proposals.
2 Most proxy votes are cast by mutual funds and other institutional investors, which collectively hold over two-thirds of the voting shares in the United States. Given the prominent role played by institutional investors in proxy voting, the effectiveness of the proxy mechanism depends largely on whether it can overcome potential agency problems so that votes are cast in an informed, objective manner. gone the other way, the deal would have been dead. Now, it's a horse race." 4 Despite anecdotal evidence that third-party advisors wield considerable influence in specific cases, there is little formal research on proxy advice. This is particularly true for non-routine, contested elections, where the information that vote recommendations bring to the market and the influence that they have on voting outcomes are potentially greatest.
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Understanding the role of proxy advice in contested votes is relevant to the broader issue of whether proxy advice represents an efficient market solution to agency and coordination problems in voting or whether, instead, it is a source of additional agency costs and inefficiencies to be borne by investors. 6 The goal of this paper is to examine empirically the economic role of third-party proxy advice in corporate proxy voting. Our sample specifically consists of recommendations issued by the leading advisory firm, Institutional Shareholder Services, during proxy contests waged from 1992 to 2005. We focus on proxy contests -in which a dissident actively and formally solicits votes to oppose incumbent management 7 -because such contentious situations are a natural setting in which to investigate the informational impact and consequences of proxy advice. Indeed, while most corporate proxy votes are routine and do not pose a material threat to management, proxy contests represent instances in which shareholders tend to face considerable uncertainty about a consequential outcome.
Our study provides the first systematic evidence on two basic questions concerning the proxy advisor's economic role in contest situations. First, do vote recommendations convey information that affects stock prices? Second, if vote recommendations do convey information, what is the precise nature of that information? To answer the second question, we examine whether vote recommendations are good statistical predictors of contest 5 Exceptions that arise in the case of non-contested elections include Bethel and Gillan (2002) , which presents evidence on the effects of ISS recommendations on votes for routine, non-contest proposals (i.e., proposals contained in management's proxy statement, rather than in a dissident proxy statement). The evidence from more recent studies of non-contested director elections also documents a positive relation between the ISS recommendation and the vote. See Cai, Garner and Walkling (2008) and Choi, Fisch and Kahan (2008) . In an empirical analysis of the non-contested vote outcome, Choi, Fisch and Kahan report that the recommendation has little or no explanatory power at the margin after other factors are taken into account. 6 Berman and Lublin (2006) illustrate the substantial value associated with proxy advice in the context of the recent acquisition of ISS. In September 2006, ISS placed itself on the market with an asking price of $500 million. The move elicited 19 bids and resulted in an eventual sale of the company to RiskMetrics for approximately $550 million. . 7 The term "proxy contest" is not formally defined in the federal securities laws, although regulations under those laws define a "solicitation in opposition" of the incumbent management and require special disclosures by the dissident and the incumbent whenever such a solicitation occurs. For our purposes, a "proxy contest" is taken to be an instance in which a dissident distributes its own proxy statement to investors to solicit votes rather than simply campaigning in favor of a shareholder proposal that has been added to the company's own proxy materials.
outcomes, and also the extent to which recommendations convey objective information about the relative merits of competing ballot proposals.
Our empirical findings suggest that voting recommendations do convey new information to the market and that the price impact depends on the direction of the recommendation.
Consistent with market efficiency, the unconditional average return around a recommendation is not statistically different from zero. However, recommendations that favor dissidents are accompanied by a positive cumulative average abnormal return of 1.92 percent, while pro-management recommendations lead to a slightly negative cumulative average abnormal return of -0.20. The difference in return is even larger for contests related to board elections. Thus, the market seems to view proxy advice favoring challengers as positive news for shareholders.
One natural interpretation of the differential stock price response is that a recommendation for (against) the dissident reinforces (weakens) the perception that the dissident would be an improvement over incumbent management. However, an alternative interpretation is that the market routinely believes that dissidents are better on average and that, rather than providing any new objective information about the two sides in the contest, a recommendation helps market participants to predict the outcome of a contest.
In our empirical analysis, we investigate two hypotheses about the information content of advisory recommendations. The first ascribes a predictive role to vote recommendations.
Under the prediction hypothesis, voting recommendations lead investors to revise their beliefs about the likely outcomes of proxy contests. In particular, recommendations could have a direct causal influence on shareholders' voting behavior (e.g., by providing voters with persuasive supportive evidence, or simply by acting as a default decision or a coordination device), or they may simply be good leading, but non-causal, statistical predictors of the outcome. 8 Our second hypothesis is the certification hypothesis which holds that voting recommendations are informative about the objective merits of dissidents 5 and incumbent management. Under this view, recommendations can help investors to learn about how much value each side in a contest can bring to the firm, rather than simply how likely each side is to win. Note that the two hypotheses-prediction and certification-are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if proxy advice does provide objective information about contingent firm valuations, we would also expect it to influence voting and outcome probabilities to some degree. However, the prediction and certification hypotheses do highlight distinct channels by which proxy advice can bring information to the market.
To investigate the two informational hypotheses, we analyze contest outcomes, recommendations, and stock-price movements around recommendations and outcomes.
We find evidence that strongly supports the prediction hypothesis. Specifically, the results
show that the direction of vote recommendations has substantial predictive power for contest outcomes. This finding is robust to different econometric specifications and persists after controlling for other factors that may plausibly explain observed outcomes, such as contest characteristics, voting rules, and ownership levels of incumbents and dissidents.
Testing for certification is more difficult than testing for prediction. It requires disentangling outcome-contingent valuation information in proxy recommendations from the price impact of updated outcome probability beliefs. We develop a statistical methodology which does this. Using this approach to control for the impact of proxy recommendations on contest outcome probabilities, we obtain parameter estimates in a simple model of certification that allows for both dissident and management certification effects. The parameter estimates provide some evidence consistent with a certification effect, i.e., vote recommendations seem to convey useful information to market participants about outcome-conditional values.
While our analysis focuses on proxy advice and corporate voting, the underlying statistical inference problem is much more general. Given interim news about a future event -that is, preliminary or incomplete news in advance of resolution of the final outcome -we want to distinguish outcome-contingent valuation information in the interim news from probabilistic information. Consequently, our empirical methodology is of independent 6 interest and can potentially be applied to other types of corporate news and events beyond the specific setting of contested proxy voting.
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Our results complement previous empirical research on proxy contests and proxy voting.
These studies include a number of papers investigating shareholder value implications of proxy contests (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) , Dodd and Warner (1983) , Pound (1989) , Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1992) , Mulherin and Poulsen (1998) (2008)). The previous studies of proxy contests largely focus on the vote resolution date, or the period thereafter, as the key time window during which critical information is revealed. Our work highlights the fact that proxy advice may disseminate information relevant to contest outcomes in the market well before a vote actually takes place. Previous research specifically on proxy advice has focused on routine, uncontested shareholder elections, rather than the contested elections (that are the focus here) in which the impact of advice is likely to be more significant.
More generally, our findings on the informational role of proxy advice have implications for the ability of the proxy voting mechanism to allocate control among rival management teams. A well-established body of work shows how agency and free-rider problems in corporate voting can lead to inefficient contest outcomes (Manne (1964) , Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) , Grossman and Hart (1980, 1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) ). Recent work shows how market institutions, such as the equity-loan market, can mitigate inefficiencies in corporate voting by reducing costly informational problems (Christoffersen et al. (2007) ). Our evidence suggests that proxy advice may represent another market development that can facilitate information aggregation in corporate voting. 9 Some examples of other possible applications are rumors and subsequent tender offers or board/management shake-ups and subsequent strategic initiatives.
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Our certification tests are related to Bhagat and Jefferis (1991) and Betton and Eckbo (2000) , who also employ estimates of outcome probabilities in their work on voting on proxy proposals. However, our approach differs in that we use estimated changes in outcome probabilities to explicitly identify the certification effect of recommendations on outcome-conditional valuations.
Finally, the results have practical implications for the role of proxy advice in corporate governance. Concerns have been voiced in the previous literature that a possible promanagement bias in third-party proxy advice might prevent the recommendations from being useful to investors − in helping to predict vote outcome or in evaluating the relative merits of the competing outcomes. Our evidence regarding the price impact, predictive content, and certification effect of vote recommendations suggests that recommendations do provide useful information and that conflicts of interest are not the sole determinant of this advising activity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional background on proxy advisors and the market for their services. To clarify the intuition behind our empirical hypotheses and tests, Section 3 presents a simple economic model of stock price formation around the delivery of a vote recommendation in the proxy context. Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical investigation, focusing on the compilation of contests and recommendations for the leading advisory service, ISS, over the study period. Section 5 presents our evidence on the stock price reaction to vote recommendations. In Section 6, we present the results of our multivariate analysis examining the prediction and certification hypotheses. Section 7 concludes.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: ADVISORY SERVICES IN PROXY VOTING
New securities rules adopted in 2003 underscore the fiduciary duty of institutional investors with respect to proxy voting. These rules obligate funds to disclose publicly how they vote on corporate ballots and require funds to adopt written policies and procedures to help ensure that proxies are voted in the best interests of clients. 10 For large, highly 8 diversified mutual funds, the costs of directly collecting information in-house and voting appropriately for every company in their portfolio may be substantial. Thus, it is not surprising that many of the largest and most visible institutional investors in the U.S., including Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, Janus, TIAA-CREF, and CalPERS, rely, in part, on research and recommendations provided by third-party proxy advisory firms.
While recent regulatory developments may have strengthened the demand for proxy advisory services, the market for such services is not new. RiskMetrics, we refer to the company as ISS since that was its name historically during our sample period.
A MODEL OF STOCK PRICES AND PROXY VOTE RECOMMENDATIONS
This section develops a simple model of stock price determination during proxy contests.
This framework guides our empirical analysis of recommendations. However, the model and, more importantly, the estimation strategy developed in Section 6.2.1 can be generalized to be used generically in any situation in which prices respond to interim news containing both probabilistic information (i.e., about the likelihood of various possible outcomes) and outcome-contingent valuation information (i.e., about how good are various alternatives) about future events. By "interim news" we mean early and incomplete information about future events before the ultimate outcomes are determined. The distinction between probability and outcome-contingent valuation information in interim news applies to most news about future corporate events. For example, the interim news might be a rumor of a possible tender offer (which updates the perceived probability of the tender offer and what control premium will be offered), or a status report about ongoing R&D (which causes a revision in beliefs about how likely will be a new product based on the research or how good such a product would be), or a board or management shake-up (which conveys information about whether a firm will experience a major change in strategic direction and what the value implications of such a change would be).
Consider a firm that is the target of a proxy contest launched by a dissident shareholder group in opposition to the company's incumbent management. The contest outcome will be determined, at the margin, by the votes of one or more shareholders who are pivotal voters. We distinguish these pivotal voters from the marginal investor who determines the market-clearing stock price in the financial market. For simplicity, we assume the marginal investor is risk-neutral with respect to uncertainty about the final outcome of the contest.
Under the additional simplifying assumption that the discount rate is zero, the equilibrium share price at a generic date t is
(1) the incumbent management (A M ). The advice potentially affects the marginal investor's assessment of both the outcome-conditional per-share valuations and the dissident-win probability. Specifically, we assume that the marginal investor's updated probability belief at date t A (after A is publicly known) changes relative to her probability belief at date
(before A is known) as follows:
where π η tA is a concurrent probability shock unrelated to A. The corresponding updated conditional per-share valuations are 16 Note that the contest outcome will generally be uncertain so long as the pivotal voter's decision is not guaranteed to coincide with what the marginal shareholder perceives to be value maximizing. Such might be the case if, for example, voters are heterogeneously informed, if information collection is costly, or if conflicts of interest exist in the voting process that cause distortions away from value maximization. Given the investor's updated beliefs, the observed stock price change over the time
, which includes the time that the recommendation A becomes public, is
This simple framework lets us formulate two distinct hypotheses regarding the impact of voting recommendations on stock prices. First, the prediction hypothesis is that a recommendation for the dissident increases the perceived probability of a dissident win, and vice versa for a recommendation for the incumbent. Such an effect might arise if the advisor's recommendation A is simply a useful statistical predictor of contest outcomes for the marginal investor or, alternatively, if it actually influences outcomes by modifying the pivotal voters' behavior. In either case, a pro-dissident recommendation increases tA π above what it would otherwise have been given a pro-management recommendation. In terms of the above model, the outcome prediction hypothesis posits that 0
The certification hypothesis is that a pro-dissident recommendation causes the marginal investor to update favorably his conditional assessment of the stock valuation that would result in case of a dissident win. Likewise, a pro-management recommendation increases the marginal investor's expectation of the stock value conditional on a management victory. Under the most straightforward version of this hypothesis, we have
The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. News of a recommendation favoring the dissident could, for example, cause all investors to anticipate a higher value of the firm under the dissident, and, thus, cause some investors to change their votes so that they favor the dissident. If such a link between certification and voting behavior is recognized by investors, news of a pro-dissident recommendation would affect an investor's beliefs both about the relative quality of the dissident (certification) and about the dissident's probability of winning the contest (prediction). Nevertheless, the certification and prediction hypotheses represent two distinct mechanisms through which proxy advice can affect stock prices. Our empirical tests in Section 6 accordingly seek to disentangle the two effects to shed light on the nature of the information that proxy advice brings to the market.
DATA
The proxy and recommendation data in this study were hand-collected from multiple data Next, we read the individual DEFC14A filings to determine if a voting episode was in fact a contested situation in which proxy advice might play a substantive role. This leads us to exclude the following episodes: 4 cases in which management filed a DEFC14A but the dissident did not; 12 cases in which the dissident was using the DEFC14A to propose only non-binding shareholder resolutions; 9 cases in which the dissident filed his or her proxy statement less than one week before the scheduled vote; and 10 cases in which the DEFC14A either pertained to a solely procedural issue (e.g., whether or not to delay an annual meeting) or was a mislabeled DEF 14A (uncontested) proxy statement. After imposing these screens, we are left with an overall sample of 342 contested voting situations.
For each contest in our overall sample, we attempt to ascertain the existence and direction of a vote recommendation, if any, issued by ISS. Our primary source of data on ISS vote recommendations is ISS itself. Senior representatives at the ISS headquarters office in Rockville, MD provided us with proxy research reports from their archives that pertained to "contested" voting situations. Each report contains an issue-by-issue summary of ISS's vote recommendations as well as a description of the contest background and a detailed analysis of the firm's corporate governance characteristics, including ownership levels, compensation, board structure, and antitakeover provisions. The reports furnished to us by ISS cover recommendations at 89 out of the 342 contests in our sample.
Since our definition of a "contest" differs from ISS's definition, a number of episodes in our sample could not be readily retrieved from ISS's archives. Therefore, we turn to other sources. First, we obtained electronic copies of an additional 72 reports from LexisNexis and from the Investext Plus database. Second, for each contest in our sample, we search the Dow Jones Factiva and LexisNexis News databases for news stories, newswires, and company releases that publicly announce ISS recommendations. Specifically, we perform keyword searches to identify all news items published within a year of the DEFC14A filing date that mention "Institutional Shareholder Services" or "ISS" in conjunction with the name of the firm. From these news items, we are able to determine ISS vote recommendations for 186 contests in our contest universe.
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Our final sample consists of 236 recommendations for 236 distinct episodes in our overall sample of contested voting. Of these, we have a news announcement but no ISS research report for 75; an ISS report but no news announcement for 50; and both an ISS report and a news announcement for 111. We are missing both reports and news announcements for 106 contests. However, upon reading further news articles, we find that a substantial number of these "missing contests" were resolved via negotiated settlements between dissidents and management, and these settlements were announced well in advance of when ISS typically issues reports. Therefore, in many of these negotiated outcomes, ISS recommendations would not have played a substantive informational role. We also note that the average stock market capitalization of firms with no recommendations ($1.36 billion) is well below that of the firms for which we do have recommendations ($2.79 billion). Hence, it seems likely that ISS never issued recommendations for some of the smaller firms, particularly during the earlier part of sample in which its coverage was less complete than it currently is. Based on this reasoning, we conclude that our sample of ISS recommendations in contested situations is fairly comprehensive.
We read news articles, ISS reports, and dissident proxy filings for each proxy contest in our sample to determine relevant background details, including whether the dissident was seeking board representation, whether there was an outstanding takeover bid by the dissident, and whether other election items were being proposed. We supplement this information with stock price data from CRSP, institutional holdings data from CDA/Spectrum 13f, and SIC codes from EDGAR. Other information, including dissident and management ownership, voting rules, internal governance arrangements, and miscellaneous contest characteristics, are obtained from proxy filings and other SEC filings. 18 We also searched the Dow Jones Factiva and LexisNexis News databases for vote recommendations issued by competing proxy advisory services, including Glass, Lewis, & Co., Egan-Jones Proxy Services, and Proxy Governance Inc. As discussed in Section 2, these competitors did not enter the industry until 2003 or later. Our search yielded only 22 contests over the sample period for which a news article mentioned a vote recommendation from one or more of these three proxy advisors. For the purposes of the present study, we focus on recommendations made by ISS.
Our empirical research design requires meaningful binary classifications of vote recommendations and contest outcomes. Since vote contests and recommendations usually involve multiple election items, we employ the following scheme: a recommendation is considered pro-dissident if ISS endorses at least one of the dissident director nominees 19 (for board-related contests) or supports at least one of the dissident proposals (for nonboard contests). With respect to contest outcomes, we classify an outcome as a dissident victory unless all of the dissident's requested election items are defeated by a vote of shareholders. Privately-negotiated settlements are classified as dissident wins. Invariably, such settlements occur only when incumbent management makes some concessions to the dissident group. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the frequency of recommendations by contest type (note that more than one type can be assigned to a given contest). Contest types include, for example, whether the contest involves a concurrent tender offer by the dissident, whether the target firm is an investment company, or whether the dissident seeks reforms of the firm's internal governance policies. Within each type category, the large majority of contests involve the dissident seeking board seats. Also, among board-related contests, the most common type involves a dissident who seeks a sale or liquidation of the company. 19 Fewer than three percent of the contests in our final sample entailed a "split" recommendation in which ISS favored some but not all of the dissident nominees. 20 For example, in early March 2001, Carl Icahn launched a proxy contest at VISX Inc., citing management's unwillingness to contemplate a sale of the company that would benefit shareholders. The company subsequently amended its shareholder rights plan and agreed to let him conduct due diligence pursuant to a sale. In May 2001, Icahn withdrew his slate of nominees, stating that there was no longer a need for a contest given management's "significant shift" toward his position. (Dow Jones News Service, May 1, 2001).
In Panel C, the sample of 236 recommendations is broken down according to the type of the soliciting dissident. Many of the soliciting dissidents are investment companies (33.1%) or nonfinancial corporations (25.0%). Only rarely is the dissident a current officer of the company (2.1%) or a labor union (2.1%). In the overall sample, recommendations are fairly evenly divided between those favoring dissidents (46.7%) and those favoring incumbent management (53.4%). Likewise, across most of the contest and dissident types, both pro-dissident and pro-management recommendations are well-represented.
EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET REACTION TO VOTE RECOMMENDATIONS
The presentation of our empirical findings proceeds in two parts. In this section, we consider the overall informativeness of the vote recommendations. We investigate this in two ways. First, we conduct an event study of returns around the time voting recommendations become public. Second, we test whether return volatility increases around voting recommendations. In Section 6, we then examine the precise nature of the information in terms of our prediction and certification hypotheses.
It should be emphasized that although our results are based on a sample of ISS recommendations, they should be interpreted as speaking to the role of proxy voting advisory services generally. Nonetheless, absent comparable data for other advisors, inferences about possible differences across individual advisors are unwarranted by the present analysis. Table 2 reports results from an event study of abnormal returns around vote recommendations. We use a standard market-model methodology to compute cumulative abnormal returns; market model parameters are estimated over a 250-day period ending 21 days before the contest filing date. While our focus is on the price responses to vote recommendations, the table puts them in the context of the full proxy contest and allows us to draw comparisons with the findings of prior literature.
Stock Price Reactions
The evidence in Table 2 underscores the economic significance of the proxy contests in our sample. The rightmost column of Table 2 shows the average cumulative abnormal return over the entire contest period. We measure the start of a contest in terms of the earliest filing date of a DEFC14A (or the filing date of the earliest "preliminary" PREC14A, if one was made). The resolution date is taken to be the earliest date on which there was an announcement of preliminary vote results or a pre-vote negotiated settlement between management and the dissident. As shown in the last column of Table 2 , the average cumulative abnormal return over the contest is large and statistically significant for the full sample (14.75 percent) and also large for the subsamples. It is noteworthy that, even for contests won by management, there is a sizable cumulative average abnormal return (13.35 percent). This suggests that even contests that are unsuccessful from the dissident's viewpoint can have a salutary impact on firm valuations, possibly by forcing managers to commit to changes that are good substitutes for what the dissident proposed.
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In addition to reporting cumulative abnormal returns around the recommendation date (considered in detail below), Table 2 also shows announcement effects surrounding the filing date and the contest resolution date individually. As in previous studies of proxy contests (see, e.g., Dodd and Warner (1983) , DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) , and Mulherin and Poulsen (1998)), the abnormal returns at the initiation of a proxy contest (at the filing date) are economically and statistically significant. The average abnormal return is 9.03 percent (significant at 1%) for all sample contests, and it is also large regardless of whether the dissident sought a board seat; whether the company was large or small relative to the sample median; whether (as a measure of ex ante dissident strength) the subsequent recommendation favored management or the dissident; whether the dissident ultimately won. Around the contest resolution date, it appears that the market regards dissident (management) wins as good (bad) news, as indicated by the observed average abnormal returns of 1.72 percent in the dissident-win subsample and -1.28 percent in the management-win subsample. A somewhat more nuanced interpretation is that it is good news when the dissident campaign goes on to win a contest, but it is disappointing news when the dissident campaign is revealed to be too weak to win.
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We now turn to returns around the recommendation date. Our event study design reflects the fact that there is uncertainty about the exact time at which vote recommendations become "public" given the sequential process under which recommendations are delivered to clients (the "report release date") and then possibly covered by the news media (the "news publication date"). When we have a publication date for the earliest Factiva or LexisNexis news story covering a recommendation, we measure the recommendation date announcement return over an event window of [-7, +1] relative to the news publication date. In the absence of any news publication date, we use an effective window of [-1,+7] relative to the report release date. Our intent in using a relatively wide event window is to ensure that we capture the price response to a vote recommendation whenever it occurswhether at the initial release of the report to institutional clients, at the date of coverage in the media, or through gradual diffusion of information via trading and word-of-mouth.
Using a wide window comes at a cost, however: measured returns will include additional noise that is unrelated to the vote recommendation.
It is public knowledge that ISS routinely issues vote recommendations. Therefore, if markets are efficient, the unconditional mean price response to vote recommendations should be zero. Table 2 shows that the average abnormal return around the recommendation date is 0.77 percent across all contests, which is not statistically different from 0 at conventional levels. However, upon conditioning on the direction of the vote recommendation, we see that recommendations for dissidents are associated with positive abnormal returns of 1.92 percent (significant at 10%), while recommendations for management are associated with insignificant, negative abnormal returns of -0.20 percent. Table 3 explores in more detail the difference in cumulative abnormal returns surrounding pro-dissident versus pro-management recommendations. 22 As shown in the table, within most subsamples the cumulative abnormal return is higher around pro-dissident recommendations. Moreover, the difference is statistically significant (at p < 0.01) for board contests. This is consistent with what one would expect given that, in contested 20 board elections, ISS typically recommends on a case-by-case basis rather than using a set of pre-determined vote guidelines (which it usually adheres to for most non-election proxy issues). The difference in abnormal returns is also significant for the subsample of contests involving smaller companies: such contests are likely to involve more overall uncertainty due to a lower amount of analyst and media coverage. In addition, we examine whether the differential price response changed after the passage of key securities laws. Regulation FD, which went into effect on October 23, 2000, prohibits public companies from giving information to investment advisers or other market professionals in advance of providing it to market participants as a whole. Interestingly, although ISS was included in the scope of Regulation FD due to its status as an investment advisor, we do not find any evidence that the stock-price response to vote recommendations changed significantly after Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD). This suggests that the enactment of Regulation FD did not critically affect ISS's ability to collect information relevant to proxy contests. Nevertheless, the overall findings in Tables 2 and 3 support the notion that proxy vote recommendations do convey new information to stock market participants.
Stock Price Volatility
The return event study evidence in Section 5.1 highlights the differential price responses to pro-dissident versus pro-incumbent recommendations. A broader, alternative measure of information flows is stock price volatility. In particular, changes in the flow of information in the market should be associated with changes in price volatility. The advantage of using volatility to measure the informational impact of recommendations is twofold: we do not need to specify the precise form of information (e.g., which side was recommended), and we do not need to average across signed returns in a given subsample (which could obscure the true informational effect if some recommendations bring good information and some bring bad information). Table 4 reports cross-sectional medians of absolute market-adjusted abnormal returns (which we use here to measure volatility in event time) for each day in the event window.
The question is whether volatility increases when vote recommendations become public.
For purposes of hypothesis testing, we use a test methodology developed in Corrado (1989) . A limitation of this test and our data is that we need to look at volatility on a daily basis. Uncertainty about the precise day on which the recommendation information becomes public will reduce the power of the test. 23 In an attempt to partially mitigate this problem, we restrict the sample to contests for which we have a Factiva or LexisNexis news announcement date. Despite the reduction in sample size, we find significant evidence that recommendations convey information to the market. In particular, the median absolute abnormal return is greater on the news announcement date than on other days in the event window.
TESTS FOR PREDICTION AND CERTIFICATION
Having documented a stock-price response to vote recommendations, we next turn to our
second question: what is the nature of the information in proxy recommendations? As discussed in Section 3, vote recommendations potentially affect stock prices in two distinct ways. First, they can alter the market's beliefs about the probability of a dissident win.
Second, recommendations can change investors' assessments of the firm valuations that would result from dissident or incumbent management victory. Although prediction and certification effects are distinct, their impact on stock prices is not additively separable. As is apparent from our basic model (see equation (5)), prediction and certification effects have an interactive influence on stock prices. For example, ceteris paribus, a revision in investors' assessment of the value from a dissident win should impact the current market value more if the perceived dissident-win probability is higher.
We test the prediction and certification hypotheses by proceeding in two interrelated steps.
First, in Section 6.1, we conduct a multivariate probit analysis of contest outcomes to test whether vote recommendations help (statistically) to predict contest outcomes beyond what is already predictable given an extensive set of contest and firm characteristics. In Section 6.2, we then conduct a probit analysis to generate predicted probabilities in the first stage of a two-stage procedure that tests for certification.
PREDICTION EFFECTS
Under the prediction hypothesis, proxy advice causes investors to update their probability beliefs about contest outcomes. Operationally, we test the prediction hypothesis by examining whether recommendations are good statistical predictors of contest outcomes after taking other factors into account.
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At the most basic level, the prediction hypothesis implies that contest outcomes should be correlated with the direction of prior proxy advice. An obvious limitation of the univariate test is that it does not account for other factors that could be correlated with both vote recommendations and contest outcomes. If proxy advice simply repackages publicly available information for forecasting outcomes, then outcomes and recommendations could still show a significant univariate association even if the recommendations have no real prediction effect. Accordingly, we turn to a multivariate probit analysis that includes controls for a variety of contest and firm characteristics, many of which have been found in previous research to be good predictors of vote outcomes.
CONTROL VARIABLES
The multivariate probit analysis of contest outcomes in Section 6.1.2 includes a number of control variables that may be related to voting behavior and outcome probabilities. Many of these have been used in the prior literature on proxy contests (see, e.g., Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Pound (1988) , Bethel and Gillan (2002) ). To avoid "look-ahead" bias, we only include variables that were available from public sources and that were observable 24 Our prediction tests do not need to identify the exact mechanism by which proxy advice causes investors to update their probability beliefs (i.e., whether a vote recommendation actually influences voting behavior or is simply perceived by investors to be a useful forecast of who will win the contest).
at the time a vote recommendation was made. Voting rules may also affect the ease with which dissidents and management can win the contest. Companies with majority-vote director election rules may present a greater challenge to dissidents because directors need more than simply a plurality to be elected.
We include a dummy variable equal to one if and only if a targeted company has a majority-vote rule in place and if the dissident is seeking board seats. At the same time, cumulative voting, which permits shareholders to cast votes unequally in favor of a particular director nominee, may make it easier for dissidents to win at least one seat.
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Accordingly, we include a dummy variable equal to one if a company permits cumulative voting and the contest involves board seats.
The type of shareholder meeting may also affect the ease with which a dissident nominee might be elected to the board. For example, at annual shareholder meetings, incumbent directors are almost always up for reelection, and, hence, dissident directors typically only need a plurality of votes to be elected. At special shareholder meetings, in contrast, dissidents arguably face a higher hurdle in that they must, first, win enough votes to 25 While the standard economic interpretation of these variables in the proxy context is a useful guide to intuition, the fact that these variables affect both whether a contest occurs and the resolution of a contest, conditional on its occurrence, limits our ability to assign a structural interpretation to these control variables in the probit analysis of the outcome data. 26 We include voting preferred stock and adjust for multiple classes of shares with differential voting rights. However, we exclude any shares underlying unexercised options because such shares would not confer voting power as of the contest record date. 27 Recall that we classify a board contest in which the dissident gains at least one seat as a dissident win.
dislodge incumbent directors and then, separately, collect enough votes to elect their own nominees. In a similar vein, consent solicitations usually are associated with higher voting thresholds (e.g., a majority of all outstanding shares and not a majority of shares represented at an annual meeting). To account for these differences, we include controls that indicate whether a particular contest was waged around a special meeting or a consent solicitation.
Dissidents and incumbents often retain professional proxy solicitors (e.g., Georgeson, Inc.)
to publicize their proxy campaigns with uncommitted shareholders. Hence, we use dummy variables to indicate whether the dissident or the incumbent management team employed an outside proxy soliciting firm. Also, following Pound (1988) , we include the log of the number of days between the contest initiation and the scheduled vote date. Longer contests afford a dissident more time to publicize a business plan and garner support. Finally, we include the number of shareholders of record to account for variable costs of soliciting proxies.
We also control for factors that could affect uncommitted shareholders' a priori opinions of the rival contestants. First, we use a dummy variable equal to one if a formal takeover offer by the dissident is already outstanding at the time of a proxy contest. Shareholders might be more inclined to elect a dissident group's nominees if they believe this could lead to the dismantling of takeover defenses and to the realization of a substantial takeover premium.
Second, we use two measures of CEO influence, the log of CEO tenure and a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is Chairman (or if there is no Chairman). These measures of influence account for the fact that shareholders might be more inclined to vote against a CEO if he seems to be personally responsible for poor firm performance. Third, we include a dummy variable equal to one if an individual dissident is an "activist investor." 28 Activist dissidents, who carry out broad reform agendas across multiple firms, may be perceived as less committed to maximizing shareholder value at any specific firm. Finally, we include context variables related to shareholders' propensity to vote for dissidents or incumbents or which control for the economic environment in which the contest takes place. These include the size of the company (total book value of assets), industry, time period, institutional ownership, and the stock price volatility and adjusted stock performance in the year preceding contest initiation.
We cannot rule out the possibility that our regressions omit some key factor that is relevant to outcome probabilities. However, we are unaware of any major omitted factor that 1) is identifiable from public proxy filings and the previous literature; 2) is widely known by investors prior to a recommendation; and 3) serves as a strong incremental predictor of the outcomes of contested director elections. Moreover, our tests of prediction would be invalidated only if all of the incremental explanatory power of vote recommendations (shown below to be quite substantial) were accounted for by omitted factors. Table 7 shows the results of probit regressions that explain contest outcomes in terms of proxy vote recommendations and our control variables. The dependent variable equals 1 if the contest is won by the dissident and 0 otherwise. Column 1, which contains our basic specification, indicates that the probability of a dissident win is positively and significantly related to the pro-dissident recommendation dummy (REC D ) after controlling for variation in industry, time, and firm size. Moreover, the strength of the relationship is economically meaningful: A recommendation in favor of the dissident is associated with an increase in the probability of a dissident win by about 19.6 percentage points.
PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS
Column 2 adds in controls for voting power, voting rules, and meeting type. Several of the controls, including dissident ownership, management ownership, and the interaction involving cumulative voting, are significant and have signs consistent with our a priori intuition. The coefficient on the consent solicitation dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the written consent solicitation process is more conducive to dissident proxy campaigns. More importantly, the coefficient on REC D continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, while structural and procedural sources of voting advantage are important determinants of contest outcomes, these factors do not subsume the apparent predictive power of proxy recommendations.
In Column 3, we account for uncommitted shareholders' attitudes towards the rival parties. The clear message from our probit analysis is that vote recommendations are good statistical predictors of outcomes, even after controlling for a variety of contest, firm, 29 We also estimate three additional probit regressions (not reported) to test whether the incremental predictive power of proxy advice differs according to key contest characteristics. Each regression is similar to that in Column 4 of Table 7 , except that REC D is replaced by two interactive variables formed from REC D and one of the following pairs: 1) binary variables indicating whether institutional ownership is above or below the sample median; 2) binary variables indicating whether prior-year stock price volatility is above or below the sample median; and 3) binary variables indicating whether a contest occurred before or after the effective date of Regulation Fair Disclosure (October 23, 2000) . In each of the three regressions, the two interaction terms involving REC D are not significantly different from each other, but they are individually positive and significant. Thus, the predictive power of REC D does not appear to differ with these three environmental characteristics. dissident, and management characteristics. The fact that the coefficient on the vote recommendation variable remains highly significant across several nested regression specifications provides strong support to the view that proxy advice brings new probability information to market participants.
CERTIFICATION EFFECTS
In this section, we turn to the certification hypothesis. As discussed earlier, testing for certification is complicated by the fact that we do not directly observe the impact of a vote recommendation on the market's underlying outcome-contingent valuation expectations.
Instead, we observe stock prices, which are expectations of these valuation assessments.
Thus, testing for certification requires disentangling the impacts of prediction and certification in interim news on stock prices. We do this by formulating a parsimonious econometric model that lets us identify structural relationships involving stock price changes, outcome probabilities, and certification effect parameters. Because stock prices and dissident win probabilities are observable (or estimable), we can estimate the underlying certification effect parameters and test specific hypotheses about the signs and magnitudes of these effects.
Certification and Stock Prices
To disentangle certification from prediction in stock prices, we extend the modeling framework outlined in Section 3. As before, let t A -1 denote a date before a recommendation announcement, and let t A be the earliest date before the contest resolution date when the recommendation A is publicly known. After the contest is resolved at date t R , stock prices will still be equal (trivially) to the expectation of conditional firm values:
where tR D is the market's outcome-contingent valuation of the stock under dissident control, tR M is the corresponding valuation under management control, and the postcontest resolution dissident-win probability is trivially 1 = tR π if the dissident wins, and 0 otherwise.
We assume that the market's (unobserved) outcome-contingent valuations depend, in a simple way, on the direction of the vote recommendation: η are mean-zero, normally distributed shocks due to later information arriving between t A and t R that are independent of each other and independent of dissident win probabilities. Note from equations (7) and (8) 
Note that the noise term η satisfies a number of convenient properties: It is normally distributed, mean-zero, and is uncorrelated with the other terms on the right-hand side of Equation (11). Therefore, if valid empirical proxies for
π , and tA π are available, we can use OLS regressions to obtain estimates of the underlying certification effect parameters.
Results of Empirical Tests for Certification
The empirical analogue of the left-hand side of Equation (11) To test the certification hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional OLS regression, which corresponds to the theoretical relationship in Equation (11) The regression yields estimates for the parameters α , 1 β , 2 β , and 3 β , which can be linearly rearranged to obtain estimates of the underlying parameters D δ , M δ , D μ , and M μ .
Estimation of (14) for the full sample can be used to test the average certification effect across all contests. However, inspection of the theoretical error structure in (12) suggests the possibility of heterogeneity in the residual term η across contest outcomes. In particular, when a contest is won by the dissident, 1 = i tR π , and we see from Equation (12) that η is independent of η . This suggests separately estimating regression (14) and deriving
, and M μ for each of two subsamples corresponding to who won the contest (i.e., the dissident group or the management group). Table 8 presents the results of the regressions. The top part of the table reports the R 2 , residual standard error, and sample size for each OLS regression, along with estimates and standard errors for each of the four underlying certification parameters. Since we expect significant heteroskedasticity given our cross-sectional samples (see in particular Equation (12)), we report heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
Columns (1) through (3) report the results from estimating the model using all observations in the first-stage probit regressions (i.e., whether or not stock price or recommendation data are available). The parameter estimates support the certification hypothesis: vote recommendations do appear to influence the outcome-contingent valuations implicit in stock prices, and they appear to do so in the natural direction. For example, in the management-win subsample the estimate of D μ is significantly negative at the 5% level.
Thus, a pro-dissident recommendation generally lowers the market's assessment of incumbent-win-contingent stock valuations. Likewise, the significantly positive estimate of D δ in the management-win subsample is consistent with the interpretation that dissidentwin-contingent valuations are revalued upwards when the proxy advisor endorses the dissident.
The bottom part of subsample, but they are in the management-win subsample (p=0.048). We also conduct separate tests that examine whether investors are specifically learning about the dissident ("dissident certification") or about management ("management certification"). As shown in
Column (3), in the management-win subsample we can reject the null hypothesis of no dissident certification effect and also the null of no management certification effect.
Finally, based on a one-sided test, in the management-win subsample we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that pro-dissident recommendations have a non-positive dissident
We also estimate additional versions of the model after imposing the requirement that the first-stage probit regressions use only observations that are also present in the second-stage OLS regression. As Columns (4) through (6) A potential concern here is that the dependent variable, i PDIFF , in Table 8 is constructed using estimated dissident win probabilities (4) through (6) of Table 8 . Thus, the evidence appears to be robust to the possibility of estimation error in the first-stage probit regressions.
CONCLUSION
This Abnormal returns are calculated using a standard one-factor market model in which market returns are measured using the return on an equal-weighted CRSP index. The initial filing date is the first date on which the dissident group filed a proxy statement (form PREC14A or DEFC14A) with the SEC. The proxy contest resolution date is the earliest news report in the Factiva or LexisNexis database of either (1) a negotiated settlement in which the dissident withdraws the contest; or (2) a resolution of the contest by vote, based on a preliminary vote count. The recommendation announcement date is defined as follows: when a public news story is available, the announcement date equals the date of the earliest such story; when no news story is available, the announcement date is imputed to be the earlier of (a) three days prior to the contest resolution date and (b) six days after the ISS report date. Only contests in which there are at least three trading days between the announcement date and the resolution date are included. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
[ Abnormal returns are calculated using a standard onefactor market model in which market returns are measured using the return on an equal-weighted CRSP index. The proxy contest resolution date is the earliest news report in the Factiva or LexisNexis news database of either (1) a negotiated settlement in which the dissident withdraws the contest; or (2) a resolution of the contest by vote, based on a preliminary vote count. The recommendation announcement date is defined as follows: when a public news story is available, the announcement date equals the date of the earliest such story; when no news story is available, the announcement date is imputed to be the earlier of (a) three days prior to the contest resolution date and (b) six days after the ISS report date. Sample sizes and t-statistics (in parentheses) are reported below means. Only contests in which there are at least three trading days between the announcement date and the resolution date are included. The rightmost column reports p-values from t-tests for differences in means. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Contest Sample
(1) All Recs.
Rec. for Mgmt.
Rec. . The sample consists of recommendation announcements identified from the Dow Jones Factiva and Lexis-Nexis databases. Abnormal returns are calculated using a market-adjusted methodology (using the return on an equal-weighted CRSP index). The recommendation announcement date is defined as the date of the earliest news story reporting a recommendation. We use the nonparametric rank test procedure described in Corrado (1989) to test the one-sided null hypotheses that the absolute abnormal return on a given day is greater than the absolute abnormal returns during the entire [filing+2,announcement+1] period. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively under the Corrado (1989) one-sided test. Takeover bid by dissident is a binary variable indicating whether or not the dissident has an outstanding takeover offer for shares of the firm. CEO tenure is the amount of time (years) the CEO has been in office. CEO is Chairman equals 1 if the CEO is the same individual as the chairman or if there is no chairman; it equals 0 otherwise. Dissident is activist equals 1 if the dissident targeted more than one company in the sample, and equal to zero otherwise. Firm size is total assets in millions of U.S. dollars, at the end of the last fiscal year preceding the record date. Institutional ownership is the percentage of outstanding equity held by institutions at the end of the latest quarter preceding the record date. Adjusted return, prior year is the raw percentage return minus the CRSP Equal-weighted index return over the calendar year ending 20 days before the first PREC14A or DEFC14A filing in a contest. All variables are constructed from SEC filings, news articles, Thomson CDA/Spectrum, or CRSP. [-20 ,1] surrounding the first PREC14A or DEFC14A contest filing, calculated using a standard one-factor market model with the return on an equal-weighted CRSP index as the market return. All other independent variables are as described in Table 6 . Each specification includes 1-digit SIC dummies and a contest-year time trend. Zstatistics appear in parentheses below estimated marginal effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
APPENDIX

Derivation of Equations (11) and (12) in the text
First, we use (3), (4), (7), and (8) , substitute into (A1), and rearrange to obtain Equations (11) and (12) in the text. Finally, note that since η is a linear combination of the fundamental shocks, it is, by construction, normally distributed, mean-zero, and uncorrelated with each of the other terms on the RHS of (12).
